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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent legislative action in the area of tort reform, both realized and
proposed,1 will adversely affect many people who lack a strong voice in
our society. Women are one such group, as recent studies showing that

1. State legislatures have passed various measures in an effort to reform their tort systems,
and continue to do so even in the face of possible federal preemption. Echoing the themes of their
Contractwith America, Republicans in Congress remain committed to enacting sweeping changes
in the civil litigation system. See Kenneth Jost, Tort Issues Resurrected, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 18;
infra Parts ULB-C.
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tort law is gender-biased have concluded. Moreover, and at least as
disquieting, the economically disadvantaged will also be affected.3
Pending congressional proposals which seek to impose a punitive damage

cap in products liability law4 will have a disparate impact upon the
poor--those with little or no means
to seek redress in our legal system
6
and limited access to legislatures.

2. See, e.g., Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: GenderInjustice
in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that restrictions of punitive and noneconomic
damages in the areas of products liability and medical malpractice negatively impact women); see
also Leslie Bender, An Overview ofFeminist Torts Scholarship,78 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 585-86
(1993) (outlining the various ways in which women are undercompensated for tortious injuries).
Bender also argues that eliminating self-interested "corporate violence" against individuals "would
reduce the frequency and quantity of mass tort litigation better than any proposed statutory reforms
curbing plaintiffs'abilities to recover for their losses.' Id. at 581-82.
3. Economically disadvantaged individuals are rarely able to access legislatures through
lobbying efforts and their general unfamiliarity with the courts effectively bars access to many who
are deserving of a legal remedy. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 103-04 (1974) (discussing the
disadvantages presented to those who are unfamiliar with the legal system and have limited access
to legal services). Similarly, "[flor people with less than a high school education and incomes of
$15,000 or less, the voter participation rates are dismayingly low." Bob Herbert, UntappedPower,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1996, at A17. Many politicians, responding to the consistently low voter
participation rates by those with lower incomes, focus on the concerns of the more upscale
socioeconomic class and "give short shrift to the interests of... the poor." Id.
4. See Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. § 107 (1997).
5. This Note defines the economically disadvantaged or poor in terms of income level.
Although frequently used in a way that stigmatizes, it should be recognized that of the 38 million
Americans recently defined as poor by the federal government, 22 million were either employed or
lived with someone who was employed. See Matthew Bowers, Working Hard, Working Poor,
ViGmNIAN-PLoT (Norfolk), Feb. 15, 1996, at A8. Bowers discussed the flaws in many assumptions
surrounding the welfare reform debate, including the idea that putting welfare recipients to work will
necessarily lead to a reduction in the welfare rolls. Many people working full-time fall below the
poverty level because of low wages and still require some sort of public assistance. See id.
6. See generallyGalanter, supranote 3 (arguing that the legal system predominantly favors
those who "have").
Congress's proposals come at a time when the poor have to contend with additional hurdles
when seeking access to the courts-federal cutbacks of the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"). See
David Barringer, DownsizedJustice,A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 60; cf.Penelope Eileen Bryan, Toward
Deconstructingthe Deconstruction of Law and Lawyers, 71 DENV. U. L. Rv. 161, 171 (1993)
(calling for an "[e]xpansion of legal aid services, government funding for law school staffed poverty
clinics, or national insurance for legal representation" in order to increase substantive changes that
could benefit the disadvantaged); Holly Metz, Invasion of the Nonlawyers, STUDENT LAW., Mar.
1997, at 38, 38 (reporting on the debate concerning paralegals who provide legal services to "lowincome people and... middle-income people [who] lacked legal assistance because they could not
afford to hire a lawyer").
The LSC, which transfers federal grant money to state programs operating approximately
1,200 local law offices nationwide, had its funding slashed by one-third in 1996, from $400 million
in 1995 to $278 million in 1996. "Because of cuts in LSC funds, 300 to 400 of those offices will
be forced to close this year, hundreds of the 4,700 lawyers employed by LSC grantees will be laid

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol25/iss3/9

2

Cady: Disadvantaging the Disadvantaged: The Discriminatory Effects of P

19971

PUNITIVE DAMAGE CAPS

Without a reconsideration of the proposed cap by Congress, and by
legislatures in those states that have already enacted such caps,7 the
economically disadvantaged will undoubtedly experience dwindling
prospects for recovering even compensatory damages. Products liability
actions are typically brought through the use of contingency fees. As the
possibility for larger awards diminish as a result of punitive damage caps,
a risk-averse lawyer will become increasingly unwilling or unable to
represent poor plaintiffs who are injured by huge corporate defendants
that have the ability to bankroll a lengthy and expensive litigation
process.' This effectively shuts out prospective poor plaintiffs from
access to the courts--in essence, if punitive damage caps are in place, a
person with little present or future economic harm other than the injury
itself can be left without any legal recourse.9
This Note explores the issues surrounding the discriminatory impact

off, and the 1.7 million cases typically handled will fall by an estimated one-third." Barringer, supra,
at 61. LSC's 1997 budget was pegged at $141 million, nearly one-half of its already reduced 1996
funding, by a House of Representatives subcommittee. See id. Perhaps urged on by state bar
associations, the House restored $109 million of those funds. See, e.g., Bars Work to Get LSC Funds
Restored, STATE B. NEWS (New York State Bar Ass'n), Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 5 (reporting on the
lobbying efforts of bar associations in New York). "Cutting the LSC any further would have sent
the public a terrible message--that only people with money are entitled to use our system ofjustice."
Id.
Future funding of the LSC, however, is still at risk. Recent court challenges, in Hawaii, New
York, and Texas, to congressionally imposed restrictions on legal aid groups' use of funds provided
by LSC and non-LSC sources may "cost the LSC some crucial support in Congress, dramatically
increasing the likelihood of deep budget cuts, if not outright elimination." Mark Hansen, Loosening
Congress' PurseStrings,A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 28,29. Before taking such a drastic step, however,
Congress should consider that "[tihe federal government 'should be in the business of providing
legal services and making sure that the justice system is accessible to everybody."' Hope Viner
Sambom, A Legal Aid Suit Spurs Conservative Outcry, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 28, 29 (quoting
comments made by Laurie Zelon, chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants, on the prospect of LSC funding cuts in response to a Voting Rights Act lawsuit filed
by Texas Rural Legal Aid).
7. Although this Note limits its scope to punitive damage caps in products liability law, the
arguments equally apply to damage caps in any area of law, and in any form, such as caps on pain
and suffering, a compensatory damages component.
8. Many plaintiffs' lawyers and general practitioners believe that congressional action will
create constraints on their ability to cover the massive expenses that necessarily accompany
litigation, and argue that "federal legislation would weight the system in favor of deep pocket
defendants and insurance companies." Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape: As Congress
Struggles to Rewrite the Nation's Tort Laws, the States Already May Have Done the Job, A.B.A.
J., Aug. 1995, at 56, 58.
9. "Without the opportunity to recover punitive damages, itwould be economically impossible
for a victim to bring a lawsuit in those cases in which actual damages would be minimal." Richard
C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 KY. LJ.1, 69 (1985-1986).
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that statutory punitive damage caps have upon those individuals in our
society who are economically disadvantaged, and identifies alternatives
which avoid this danger. Part II examines the "quasi-criminal" nature of
punitive damages and its twin objectives of deterrence and retribution.
This Part also explores three ancillary functions that punitive damages
commonly accomplish: education, policing, and compensation.
As mentioned above, Congress has proposed a punitive damage cap
in products liability actions, but it is not the only governmental
institution that has entered the tort reform arena in general, or products
liability law in particular. Recently, state legislatures have successfully
passed tort reform legislation, much of it primarily impacting products
liability litigation. In addition, the Supreme Court has struggled with the
constitutional limits of punitive damages during the last decade. The
roles that the Supreme Court, Congress, and state legislatures have
played in this area is recounted in Part HI.
Part IV argues that much of the fervor surrounding a perceived
litigation crisis is unfounded. Pointing to runaway jury verdicts that
award excessive punitive damages, tort reform proponents claim that the
tort system has run amok and is in dire need of repair. It is argued that
the alternative to reform is increased costs which must be passed on to
consumers, reduction of new product innovation in an effort to avoid
products liability litigation, and an economy that cannot compete in the
global market. Advocates for reform, however, rely primarily on
anecdotal evidence to support their claims. The few notable empirical
studies reach a much different conclusion; a tort system that is functioning properly, with little or no threat to the economic health of American
businesses.
Even assuming that tort reform is necessary or desirable, Part V
suggests specific tort reform proposals which are not susceptible to
charges of discrimination against those who cannot claim large economic
losses. While offering defendants adequate protection from the possibility
of excessive punitive damage awards, these proposals will not eradicate
or limit an economically disadvantaged individual's access to our court
system.
II.

THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages are monetary damages awarded to a plaintiff in a
civil action, usually determined by a jury, after a finding that a defendant
was guilty of flagrantly violating a plaintiff's rights. Such a violation will
be found where a defendant has acted intentionally, maliciously or with
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a conscious, reckless, willful or wanton disregard for a plaintiff's
interests.' ° The amount assessed is typically based upon a jury's
determination of the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury, combined with
the extent of the defendant's wealth." A jury's consideration of a
defendant's wealth is commonly held to be appropriate, insofar as awards
must be large enough to support the two most often stated objectives of
punitive damages: (1) retribution, to punish the defendant for outrageous
conduct; and (2) deterrence, to prevent or discourage similar misconduct
in the future, not only by the defendant but by others as well. 12 The
objectives of punitive damages directly reflect one of the two overriding
principles of tort law, which are compensation to injured people for harm
that others are liable for, and deterrence of that harmful behavior in the
future.'3 Unlike these tort law principles, when a person acts in a
particularly egregious manner--by intentionally causing harm, for
example-tort law allows for exemplary or punitive damages as a form
of retribution. The element of retribution in punitive damages, however,
is more commonly associated with its analog in criminal law, rather than
civil tort law.
Because of the retribution objective, punitive damages are viewed
as falling somewhere between the civil and the criminal law, and are
commonly regarded as "quasi-criminal."' 4 They are awarded to plaintiffs in civil lawsuits, yet they are noncompensatory and more similar to
penal fines.15 This overlap between the civil and criminal laws' objectives and effects "assures that controversy and debate follow such
assessments wherever they may roam, as surely as summer follows
spring."' 16 However, an inspection of the ancillary functions that
punitive damages accomplish arguably renders these "quasi-criminal"
concerns less troublesome.

10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1977).

11. See id. § 908(2).
12. See id. § 908 cmt. a.
13.

There is, of course, a logical inconsistency when applying the deterrence function of tort

law to merely negligent behavior Can an individual "choose" to act negligently? In the sphere of
punitive damages, however, this does not present a problem. Punitive damages are awarded only

when a person or entity engages in egregious behavior, encompassing actions for which a tortfeasor
either had knowledge or should have had knowledge.
14. See David G. Owen, A PunitiveDamages Overview: Functions,Problems andReform, 39

ViLL. L. REV. 363, 365 (1994).
15. See id.at 364-65.
16. Id. at 366; see also Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigmof Efficiency
in Tort Law, 87 COLtIM. L. REV. 1385, 1403 (1987) (noting that "two of the areas in which punitive
damages awards have been most controversial are medical malpractice and products liability").
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Education, the first ancillary function of punitive damages, serves
a twofold purpose; it notifies the public of both the existence of a
particular legally protected right and the importance the legal system
attaches to the remedy of egregious breaches of society's rules. As an
expression of the community's disapproval of serious misconduct,
punitive damages serve to reaffirm society's commitment to upholding
legal and moral standards. 7 In products liability actions, the education
function also serves to inform the public of defective products.
Unfortunately, the education function is not always fulfilled for two
reasons. First, while instances of extreme misconduct (for example, the
Ford Pinto and the Dalkon Shield) are highly publicized, not all instances
of egregious misconduct receive the type of media coverage which
reaches large portions of our society. 8 Second, it is not unusual for
settlement negotiations to occur after a jury awards punitive damages.
Defendants offer not to pursue avenues of appeal, and a corresponding
protraction of litigation and increased expense, in return for a successful
plaintiff's silence regarding the terms of the monetary settlement reached
and the issues surrounding his or her injuries. 9 In cases where the
plaintiff is poor or of relatively modest means, a confidential settlement
in return for an end to the litigation is often accepted. 0
Society rarely learns the truth about dangerous products whenever
confidential settlements occur. Either the facts become obscured or
distorted, when post-verdict settlements are reached,2 ' or the issues are

17. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Litigation,74 MICH. L. REV.

1258, 1280-81 (1976) In addition, Owen notes that punishment also educates wrongdoers as to
society's legal values and "serves as a reformative device," allowing for the offender "to atone for
his misdeed through suffering." Id. at 1281.

18. It should be recognized that the general news media does not have the ability or desire to
report every award of punitive damages. Typically, reports are limited to situations in which the
subject of the litigation affects a broad spectrum of society. At times, the punitive damage award
itself is deemed newsworthy merely because of its amount.
19. See RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
PERVERSION OF JusTIcE IN AMERICA 75-76 (1996).

20. See id. at 76 (discussing plaintiff's motivation to accept a pretrial confidential settlement
because it provides "money that is often desperately needed, without further delay or risk of losing
the case in trial"); cf.Galanter, supra note 3, at 119-22 (arguing that overcrowded court systems
create delays that increase the cost and risk associated with adjudication, which tends to favor the
influential to the detriment of the economically disadvantaged who cannot survive long waits without
relief).
21. For example, many people remain unaware of the true circumstances of the McDonald's
coffee case involving Stella Liebeck, which is frequently cited by tort reform advocates as an
example of a tort system run wild. Liebeck later entered into a confidential settlement with
McDonald's after winning her case. See infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
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never reported, when pretrial settlements occur.22 This hampers "the
justice system's vital role of warning society about safety hazards and
stigmatizing, and thereby deterring, unethical conduct."
Policing, the second ancillary function, reflects the fact that punitive

damages often serve the important purpose of providing reluctant
individuals and their attorneys incentives to bring lawsuits to curtail

serious misconduct and enforce the rules of law.24 Because most of the
misconduct in this area is not within the realm of the criminal law,
plaintiffs act as "private attorneys general. ' ' 5 Although punitive

damages are frequently criticized as a "windfall" to plaintiffs and their
attorneys,2 6 it is precisely this windfall which provides the incentive and
monetary means whereby both will undertake the often time-consuming
and expensive task of "prosecuting" wrongdoers.27 Corporations possess
large financial reserves which enable them to mount lengthy pretrial and

appeal mechanisms, often to the detriment of not only poor plaintiffs, but
their lawyers as well. Given the frequent contingency arrangement
arrived at in tort cases, it becomes clear that punitive awards are the fuel
that drives risk-averse lawyers toward bringing such actions. 2 Individu-

als with limited earning capacity have little present or future economic
damages that can be claimed, other than the specific injury itself.

Lawyers are less likely to offer representation to these prospective clients

22. The public, perhaps, is the biggest loser and suffers most when pretrial confidential
settlements occur. It allows defendants to claim that they did nothing wrong and prevents the public
from learning if a particular product, for example, is unsafe.
Worse, the settlement offer will require that all the evidence discovered in the case be
sealed against disclosure to other persons similarly injured, other lawyers representing
such persons, the media, and government regulators-even if the secrecy serves no
beneficial public purpose, and even if it endangers the public safety.
NADER & Shmr, supra note 19, at 76.
23. Id. at 356.
24. See Owen, supra note 17, at 1287-90.
25. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW O1F
REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205 (1973); Michael
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity ofPunitive Damages Awards: Reforming the
Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1322 (1993).
26. See Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a PrincipledApproach, 31
HASTINGS W. 639, 644 (1980).
27. See Leslie E. John, Comment, FormulatingStandardsfor Awards ofPunitive Damages in
the Borderlandof Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2051 (1986); see also DOBBS, supra
note 25, § 3.9, at 205 (describing punitive damage awards as a "bounty" that provides a plaintiff
with an incentive to sue).
28. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, PoeticJustice:PunitiveDamages andLegalPluralism,
42 AMi.U. L. REV. 1393, 1410 (1993).
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without the availability of punitive damages unfettered by statutory
caps.2 9

Compensation, the last ancillary function, can be a confusing
concept. Rarely viewed as compensatory, punitive damages are monetary
awards given separately and in addition to compensatory damages. How,
then, can they be construed as fulfilling a "compensatory" function?
When one considers the policing function, punitive damages can often
serve to give economically disadvantaged individuals access to the courts

and an opportunity to seek restitution which would otherwise be unavailable.3" Moreover, computation of future earnings, a component of

compensatory damages, is based largely on what an individual plaintiff
presently earns or can expect to earn. There is little acknowledgement of
the possibility that economically disadvantaged plaintiffs might substantially increase their earnings capacity in the future.3 Additionally, the

contingency fee system itself ensures that plaintiffs will be systematically
undercompensated, given the large legal fees they must pay.3" In fact,
many commentators have argued that compensatory awards suffer from
systemic undervaluation even before lawyers' fees are deducted, noting
that the imposition of punitive damages merely aids the effort to make
plaintiffs whole. 3 Thus punitive damages can serve as a means to more
29. See Laura Duncan, Painful Decisions: New Business Risks Await Both Plaintiff and
Defense Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 66, 69 ("If fewer cases are viable for plaintiff's lawyers,
the revamped laws may prompt lawyers to redouble marketing efforts to woo the 'best' clients.").
30. Others have recognized this pitfall as well, particularly in jurisdictions that have already
imposed some type of cap on damages. "[P]eople who are unemployed or have low incomes-and
thus traditionally could prove little, if any, economic damages--are now less attractive as potential
clients because of caps on noneconomic damages." Id. at 66.
31. This is a lesser concern for wealthier plaintiffs earning relatively high wages because of
the marginal increase of benefit accruing from an increase in their income.
32. See Owen, supra note 17, at 1295-96 (finding that punitive damages serve a valuable role
by fulfilling a compensatory function in products liability cases); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 25,
at 1321 (same). Professor Owen also noted that
[t]he total costs of preparation and litigation tend to be especially high in product cases
because of the technical and complex nature of the issues and the resulting difficulties
of discovery and proof.... Even in cases in which liability is fairly clear, the vagaries
of the litigation process insure that some valid claims will go completely or partially
unpaid.
Owen, supra note 17, at 1293; see also RICHARD POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 34 (1986) (noting the argument that punitive damages may compensate tort victims for
their litigation costs).
33. See, ag., Johnston, supranote 16, at 1388-89 (arguing that punitive damage awards correct
the legal system's tendency to underestimate a plaintiff's damages); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really
Know Anything About the Behaviorof the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147, 1221 (1992) (stating that "([in higher stakes case, such as air crashes, product liability,
and medical malpractice, the undercompensation will be dramatic').
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fully compensate a deserving plaintiff's injury.
III. PuNITIVE DAMAGES AND TORT REFORM

Much of the clamor for tort reform has focused on a perceived
"litigation crisis."34 Although merely rancorous at times, the ensuing
debate has shaped reaction by the government on both the federal and
state level. In the area of punitive damages, recent Supreme Court
decisions may lead to increasingly adverse judicial determinations for
otherwise successful plaintiffs. Proposed legislation by Congress, capping
punitive damages in products liability law, would preempt existing state
law altogether. In addition, states continue to impose limitations on the

Similarly, Marc Galanter, Director of the Institute for Legal Studies and Professor of Law
at the University of Wisconsin, while commenting on caps of pain and suffering awards, noted that
"it is the most severely injured who are, on the whole, the least adequately compensated. Hence caps
not only frustrate the compensation goal of the system, but they detract from its equity." Marc
Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1122 (1996).
The costs associated with bringing personal injury cases in products liability actions where
punitive damages are awarded just became even more costly. In 1996, the Intemal Revenue Service
("IRS"), Congress, and the Supreme Court teamed up to subject punitive damage awards to personal
income tax liability. The IRS began by pushing to find cracks in the Internal Revenue Code's rule
that "gross income does not include ...

the amount of any damages received

...

on account of

personal injuries." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1995); see also Richard C. Reuben, Pouring Salt in the
Wound, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 40.
Prompted by the IRS, Congress entered the fray in August, and amended the tax code to read
"gross income does not include ... the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages)
received on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1996).
The amendment operates prospectively, however, covering only those punitive awards received after
it was enacted. See generally Jill Schachner Chanen, Uncle Sam 's OutstretchedHand, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1997, at 30; Henry J. Reske, Taxing Times for Plaintiffs, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 22.
Later that December, agreeing with arguments presented by the IRS, the Supreme Court, in
O'Gilviev. UnitedStates, 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996), ruled that punitive awards in personal injury cases
are taxable as gross income as well. This subjects punitive damage awards to taxation even when
received prior to the congressional amendment of the tax code. See Chanen, supra,at 30. Estimates
in the O'Gilvie case are that "the family will take home about $2.2 million of the $10 million
punitive award" after paying taxes, attorney fees, and costs. Id.
Many believe that the IRS's next target will likely be structured, post-verdict settlements in
cases where punitive awards could have been claimed. The IRS has already begun questioning
settlements that allocate a large amount of money to compensatory damages, while limiting the
amount designated as punitive. See id. (reporting on Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995),
appeal docketed, No. 96-1768 (8th Cir. 1996), which will determine the limitations of IRS review
on structured settlements). The upshot is that plaintiffs who are awarded punitive damages will incur
large tax liabilities, even if they enter into a settlement after the case. Increasingly, the argument that
punitive damages represent a "windfall" for plaintiffs is becoming even more overstated, if not
obsolete.
34. For one of the most widely read works to assert that the legal system is in dire need of
reform, see WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED ThE LAWSUIT (1991).
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tort system and many have recently passed legislation which places limits
on punitive damages despite the spectre of congressional preemption.
Unfortunately, the resulting impact that these developments will have
upon the economically disadvantaged has been largely ignored.
A.

Supreme CourtDecisions RegardingPunitive Damages

Within the past decade, the Supreme Court has attempted to solve
some of the more nettlesome constitutional problems presented by
punitive damages-primarily a determination of when, if ever, a punitive
award violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
Court, however, has been reluctant to announce any clear set of
boundaries or procedures for determining the constitutional limits of
punitive damages. Accordingly, the problem facing reviewing courts
remains how to discern if a particular award is excessive.
Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw35 concerned an award
of $20,000 in compensatory damages and $1.6 million in punitive
damages on a finding that an insurer-defendant had acted in bad faith by
failing to settle a health and accident policy that provided benefits for
accidental loss of limb.16 Before the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the punitive award violated the Due Process, Contract, and
Excessive Fines Clauses of the Constitution, 7 but the Court ruled that
the constitutional issues were not properly raised below and failed to rule
on them." In a concurring opinion that presaged subsequent Court
decisions on the subject, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin
Scalia voiced a deep concern for the "wholly standardless discretion to
determine the severity of punishment [which] appears inconsistent with
due process."3'9

35. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
36. See id. at 73-75.
37. The Contracts Clause prohibits the states from passing any "Law impairing the Obligation

of Contracts." U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10. The Eighth Amendment provides that "fe]xccssive bail
shall not be required, nor e=xessivefines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
amend. VIII (emphasis added).
38. See Banker'sLife & Casualty,486 U.S. at 76. "[We may, for good reason, even at this
stage, decline to decide the merits of the issue, much as we would dismiss a writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.' Id. at 77 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 512 (1966)).
39. Id. at 88. Under Mississippi law at that time, the standard for awarding punitive damages

centered on the mental state of the tortfeasor, but "'the determination of the amount of punitive
damages is a matter committed solely to the authority and discretion of the jury."' Id. (quoting
Banker's Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 278 (Miss. 1985)).
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In Browning-FerrisIndustries v. Kelco Disposal,Inc.,40 the Court
ruled that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause was limited
to criminal cases and did not apply to civil actions, and thereby did not
apply to punitive damage awards as well.4' The jury below had awarded
$51,146 in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages
based on a finding of tortious interference through predatory pricing.4 2
After a careful and extensive analysis, the Court stated that
even if we were prepared to extend the scope of the Excessive Fines
Clause ... , we would not be persuaded to do so with respect to cases
of punitive damages awards in private civil cases .... [Tjhe Eighth
Amendment places limits on the steps a government may take against
an individual, whether it be keeping him in prison, imposing excessive
monetary sanctions, or using cruel and unusual punishment... . While
we agree with petitioners that punitive damages advance the interests
of punishment and deterrence, which are also among the interests
advanced by the criminal law, we fail to see how this overlap requires
us to apply the Excessive Fines Clause in a case between private
parties. 43
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance (Co.v. Haslip,44 the Court upheld
a punitive award, ruling that punitive damages were not per se unconstitutional. 45 The Court stated that "[w]e need not, and indeed we cannot,
draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable
and constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case."46 The issue
in Haslip centered around a punitive damage award of approximately
$800,000 to a group of insureds against a life insurance agent who
had continued to collect premiums after their policies had been
cancelled. 4' The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was roughly
four to one, which the Court thought might be "close to the line" of
constitutional acceptability.4 9 "[G]eneral concerns of reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

492 U.S. 257 (1989).
See id. at 275-76.
See id.
at 259-61.
Id. at 275.
499 U.S. 1 (1991).

45. See id. at 17.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
See id. at 7 n.2.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 23.
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5'
properly enter into the constitutional calculus."
When examining due process challenges to punitive damage awards,
it is interesting to note that Haslip was the first case in which the Court
took the opportunity to state that both procedural and substantive due
process analysis is necessary. "One must concede that unlimited jury
discretion--or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing
of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities."'" The Court continued its analysis by identifying
factors that it hoped would ensure procedural due process for defendants
subjected to punitive damages. These factors are as follows:

(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive
damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's
conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that
conduct the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence
and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the
defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that
profit and of having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial
position" of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the
imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these
to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards
against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be taken in
mitigation. 2
The Haslip Court recognized that in "determining whether a punitive
award is reasonably related to the goals of deterrence and retribution...
the factfinder must be guided by more than the defendant's net
worth." 3 In general, the Haslip factors reflect many of the underlying
principles for imposing punitive damages. Factor (a), a reasonable
relationship between the harm and the amount of the award, however, is
apparently the Court's answer to a substantive due process safeguard.
Factors (b) the degree of reprehensibility, (c) profitability, (d) the
defendant's wealth and (e) the costs associated with the litigation, reflect
punitive damage's retribution and deterrence objectives. Moreover, factor
(e) can be viewed as an implicit recognition of punitive damage's
"compensatory" function.' The mitigating factors, (f) whether criminal

50. Id. at 18.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 21, 22.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
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sanctions have been imposed and (g) whether other civil awards have
been awarded, are safeguards to multiple award assessments against
defendants for the same conduct. Although these factors are broad in
scope and lack definitive application, that fact should not detract from
their usefulness. As the Court noted, there can be no "bright-line" rule
for the determination of the constitutional reasonableness of a particular
punitive damage award.
Furthermore, unlike the imposition of statutory caps on punitive
damages, Haslip's factors do not have the effect of inhibiting economically disadvantaged plaintiffs from seeking redress in the courts. The
mitigating factors, which can be used to limit the amount of punitive
damages awarded, do not impose clearly quantifiable ceilings on those
awards-ceilings that discourage risk-averse plaintiffs' attorneys from
bringing such claims whenever the prospective client is poor.
In TXO ProductionCorp. v. Alliance Resources Co.,, a jury award
of $19,000 in compensatory and $10 million in punitive damages 6 was
upheld by the Court against a charge of excessiveness, despite a ratio of
approximately 526 to 1.57 The Court retreated slightly from the procedural due process standards espoused in Haslip5 8 -due process was not
violated even though the trial judge's review of the punitive damages
awarded did not include a written opinion stating reasons for upholding
the award.59 Under TXO, however, it is unclear how an appellate court
can determine whether a particular defendant is in fact deserving of a
high punitive damage assessment, other than mere reliance on the record
alone; precisely what the Court did in TXO itself. The lack of a written
opinion stating the reasons for upholding a punitive damage award
creates a situation wherein federal appellate courts will continue to grant
great deference to state court decisions, even when the precise reasoning
of those decisions is unknown.6 ° This result is strange indeed, particularly when constitutional matters are being decided.
Ironically, it is noteworthy to recognize that the primary reasons
why the TXO Court upheld such a large punitive damage award is that
it complied with some of the Haslip factors: (a) the reasonable relation55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

509 U.S. 443 (1993).
See id. at 446.
See id. at 453, 459, 462.
See 449 U.S. at 21-22; see also supra text accompanying note 52.
See TXO Prod Corp., 509 U.S. at 464-65.
"[With its decision in TXO ... the Court has effectively limited federal review of punitive
damage awards . . . ." Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A
ProposedAlternative, 20 J. LEGIS. 191, 194 (1994).
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ship between the punitive damage award and the harm likely to result
from the defendant's conduct; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct; and, (c) the profitability to the defendant of the
wrongful conduct. At the trial level, the court found that TXO Corporation was engaged in an ongoing pattern of attempting to fraudulently
transfer land titles which, if successful, would have netted the corporation
millions of dollars.6'
The fact remains, however, that if written opinions which include
the reasons for upholding a punitive damage award are not required, both
plaintiffs who argue inadequacy and defendants who argue excessiveness
of those awards may be disadvantaged on appeal. Similar to the situation
in the TXO litigation itself, it is impossible for an appellate court to
determine with any certainty whether the Haslip factors actually formed
the basis for a reviewing court's decision to either reduce or uphold a
jury's punitive damage award.
The Court, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,62 held that procedural
due process requires courts to provide some form of meaningful judicial
review to defendants who are challenging punitive damages for reasons
of excessiveness6 3 Focusing on issues of procedural due process, the
Court criticized the Oregon Supreme Court for interpreting Oregon's
Constitution as allowing only limited judicial review of any punitive
damages determination made at the trial level.' Oregon courts had held
that a jury's punitive award may not be reduced on review; it may be set
aside entirely, but only if there is no basis for the award at all 6 The
Court noted that punitive damages may be unfairly assessed against
defendants for the wrong reasons.' Therefore, courts must provide
adequate procedural safeguards in order to protect defendants67 from
arbitrary jury awards, thereby satisfying the Due Process Clause.

61. See TXO Prod Corp., 509 U.S. at 460-61.
62.
63.
64.
amended
65.
66.

114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
See id. at 2341.
See id. at 2338 (citing Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 210 P.2d 461 (Or. 1949) (interpreting
Article VII § 3 of the Oregon Constitution)).
See id. at 2338-39.
The Court stated:

Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury
instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the
presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will
use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without
strong local presences.
Id. at 2340-41.
67. See id. at 2341.
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In 1996, the Court decided BMf of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 8
which addressed, once again, the constitutional limits of punitive damage
awards. For the first time, however, the Court overruled a state court's
decision to uphold a punitive award, based on a finding that the
constitutional boundary of excessiveness had been crossed.
The case involved an owner whose car had undisclosed paint touchups prior to sale.69 The plaintiff was awarded $4,000 in compensatory
damages and $4 million in punitive damages. The jury reached the figure
for the punitive award by multiplying the number of instances that BMW
had engaged in pre-sale refurbishing, documented at trial as approximately 1,000 cars nationwide, by the amount of the compensatory award."0
On review, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced this amount by half, to
$2 million,7' based primarily on the fact that only 14 of the 1,000
occurrences took place within the state.72 Moreover, there was no
evidence offered at trial to indicate how many of the nationwide
instances took place in states that outlawed such conduct. 3
In a narrow five-to-four decision, the Court reiterated its position
that it is impossible to "'draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that
would fit every case."' 74 In determining that the punitive damage award
was excessive, three "guideposts" were enunciated by the Court: "the
degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the disparity between the
harm or potential harm... and [the] punitive damages award[ed]; and
the difference between this remedy [in this case] and the civil penalties
' According to the Court,
authorized or imposed in comparable cases."75
"[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a
punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the
' Pointing out that the harm to the plaintiff was
defendant's conduct."76
purely economic and had no effect on the car's performance or safety,

68. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), rev'g 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994); see also Linda Greenhouse,
High CourtExamines, Gingerly,Issue of Punitive Damages' Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1995, at
A18.
69. See BMW of N. An., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1994).
70. See id. at 627.
71. See id. at 629.
72. See id. at 627.
73. See id.
74. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1602 (1996) (quoting Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
75. Id. at 1598-99.
76. Id. at 1599.
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the Court found that in this case none of the aggravating factors which
indicate particularly reprehensible misconduct were present."
In a blistering dissent, Justice Scalia chided the majority for
rendering a decision that was merely "dressed up as a legal opinion,"' 78
and stated that none of the precedents upon which the majority relied
"actually took the step of declaring a punitive award unconstitutional
simply because it was 'too big."' 7 9 In a separate dissent, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg agreed with Justice Scalia's observation that the decision
was "an unjustified incursion into the province of state governments."80
Justice Ginsburg also found "[t]he Court's readiness to superintend state
court punitive damages awards... all the more puzzling in view of the
Court's longstanding reluctance to countenance review, even by courts
of appeals, of the size of verdicts returned by juries in federal district
court proceedings."'"
Interestingly, BMW seems to add another layer onto a state court's
determination of the constitutional reasonableness of any punitive
damages awarded. Even though "[p]unitive damages may properly be
imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition,"' the Court added that "[tihe

77. See id. Professor Michael Rustad, commenting on this aspect of the decision, stated the
following:
One of the things the decision does, which is interesting, is that it sets a hierarchy
of what is considered societally harmful. It says protecting consumers from fraud is less
important than preventing harms to the public safety. It would give unscrupulous
businesses a competitive advantage if punitive damages are not appropriate where there
has been fraud. What kind of example is that?
I see BMW's action as far more serious than portrayed by the popular press. In
all consumer laws, one of the paramount values is disclosure and that didn't occur here.
Alabama had the right to set a high value on that, to set the morals of the market quite
high.
Timothy J. Mullaney, CourtLimit on PunitiveDamages Clouds ProductLiabilityCases, BALTIMORE
SuN, June 2, 1996, at IL.
78. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1611.
79. Id. In addition, Justice Scalia believed that "the 'guideposts' mark a road to nowhere; they
provide no real guidance [to state courts] at all." Id. at 1613.
80. Id. at 1610. Justice Ginsburg was convinced that the Court had "unnecessarily and
unwisely venture[d] into territory traditionally within the States' domain." Id. at 1614.
81. Id. at 1617. Stating that the majority "has only a vague concept of substantive due process,
a 'raised eyebrow' test as its ultimate guide," id., Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that "the Court
will work at [reviewing punitive damage awards] alone. It will not be aided by the federal district
courts and courts of appeal." Id. Many commentators believe that it is simply impossible to review
every award that arguably calls for the Court's consideration. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Justices
Void PunitiveAward: FiveEyebrows to Four,6 Legal Opinion Letter No. 19 (Wash. Legal Found.),
July 12, 1996.
82. 116 S. Ct. at 1595 (citations omitted).
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sanction imposed in this case cannot be justified on the ground that it
was necessary ... without considering whether less drastic remedies
could be expected to achieve that goal."8'3 Lower courts may now have
the daunting task of determining whether legitimate state interests can be
furthered by lesser penalties.'
Although tort reformers generally applaud the BMW decision, many
debate its significance. 5 It seems clear, however, that the Supreme
Court is still struggling to offer some sort of meaningful guidance to
state courts when reviewing punitive damage awards for excessiveness.
The Court's refusal to give a clear ruling on the issue, preferring instead
to create Haslip "factors" and BMW "guideposts," does not clearly
generate the level of discriminatory impact that statutory caps place upon
the poor. It does, however, serve to pave the way for a judicial system
that will be more willing to reduce punitive awards, deserving or not.
Although less drastic, systemic reductions of punitive damage awards can
exhibit the same discriminatory effect upon the poor as outright caps.
Court-imposed reductions, however, offer a more flexibile approach than
statutory caps, which lie within the province of federal and state
legislatures."6
B.

Congress'sProposalsfor Tort Reform

In keeping with their Contract with America, Republicans in the
104th Congress helped hammer through proposed legislation that would

83. Id. at 1603.
84. On the other hand, Justice Scalia identified this as merely a "loophole that will encourage
state reviewing courts to uphold awards as necessary" to adequately protect their citizens. Id. at 1613
(dissenting opinion).
85. See, e.g., Baker, supranote 81 ("[]n some ways, this decision is like finding out the score
in a baseball game in the fifth inning. We know that the game is not over and it is far from clear
who will win and who will lose."); Marcia Coyle, PuniesDecision Gives Business Potent Ammo,
NAT'L LJ., June 3, 1996, at Al1 (reporting that the BMW award "'could simply be the
aberration"); Pamela Anagnos Liapakis, Don't Rely Yet on the 'Gore' Decision, NAT'L L.J., June
17, 1996, at A23 ("Gore may yet turn out to be a Waterloo for the business community-more
curiosity than landmark."); Henry J. Reske, GuidelinesInstead of BrightLines, A.B.A. J., July 1996,
at 36, 36 (noting that even "players in the tort reform debate are divided on the impact of the
ruling").
86. As Justice Ginsburg observed in BMW, the Court should not unnecessarily involve itself
in "an area dominantly of state concern," 116 S. Ct. at 1615 (dissenting opinion), especially when
doing so is "in the face of reform measures recently adopted or currently under consideration in
legislative arenas." Id.at 1614. Since the Court's decision, however, lower courts may be more likely
to strike down large punitive awards on constitutional grounds. See eg., Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d
805 (2d Cir. 1996); Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
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bring about major changes in our civil litigation system. 7 The House's
vision of legal reform was incorporated into three bills,8 8 one of which

87. During the 1994 congressional elections, more than 300 House candidates of the
Republican Party promised to enact sweeping tax and social reform legislation if elected. Their
Contract with America included ten major provisions: (1) Balanced Budget, a constitutional
amendment requiring a balanced federal budget within seven years of enactment; (2) Crime Control,
adding new mandatory minimum sentences and tougher death penalty provisions; (3) welfare
Reform, cutting off AFDC payments after two years and banning aid to unwed mothers under the
age ofeighteen; (4) Education and Children, establishing school voucher programs, a tracking system
to find "dead-beat" parents and strengthening of child pornography laws; (5) Middle-Class Tax Cut,
creating a $500 tax credit for families that earn below $200,000 per year, a tax credit to offset the
"marriage penalty" and IRA accounts that would provide for tax-free interest on withdrawal; (6)
National Security, increasing defense spending and prohibiting U.S. armed forces from serving under
U.N. command; (7) Senior Citizens, proposing tax cuts, tax-free withdrawal from IRA's for longterm care and raising the Social Security earnings limit; (8) Capital Gains Tax Cut, cutting the
capital gains tax and adjusting the purchase price for inflation; (9) Legal Reform, instituting civil
reform to limit punitive damages and to impose a "loser pays" rule; (10) Congressional Term Limits,
a constitutional amendment limiting terms or time served in Congress to 12 years. See Michael Ross,
GOP's 10-PointPlan, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1994, at A-5. See generally NEWT GINGRICH ET AL.,
CONTRACT WrrH AMERICA. (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (detailing Republican's
proposals for reform which they "contracted" to as a result of the 1994 elections).
88. The first bill, the Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995), was
a modified version of the English Rule, or "loser pays" rule. It would have required the party who
rejects a settlement offer to pay reasonable attorney's fees not exceeding the actual costs. See iL§ 2.
Passed on March 7, 1995, the measure never came before President Clinton because of inaction by
the Senate. See Otto G. Obermaier & Lee Dranikoff, CongressionalLegislation Seeks Litigation
Reform, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 23, 1995, at SI; Jim Ramstad, Reform the Legal System Now, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 1996, at A21.
During its consideration, many argued that the merits of imposing such reform were dubious
at best.
Opponents fear this "loser pays" rule will skew the negotiating process dramatically in
that small businesses or individual litigants will often be unable or unwilling to take the
additional financial risk of trying the case. Proponents see the bill as a way to stem the
rising tide of civil litigation, promote settlement, and reduce frivolous lawsuits. A recent
Department of Justice study indicates that only 2% of all civil cases go to trial, so we
leave you to draw your own conclusions.
Louise Cobbs, Product Liability Reform: The Ups and Downs of Tort Reform Legislation,
METROPOLITAN CORP. CouNs., Nov. 1995, at 12, 12.
This provision, which has the superficial appeal of a Betty Crocker recipe for fair
play, would actually have the opposite effect of that intended.
Instead of promoting settlements and avoiding litigation, 'loser pay' would give
little incentive to wealthy defendants to settle cases and would give them every reason
to prolong pretrial proceedings and to take more and more cases to trial.
Janet T. Mills, Tort Reform Tangles with ictims'Rights, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Sept. 1, 1996,
at IC.
Ironically, England is considering abolishing application of the rule altogether and moving
toward adopting a contingency fee system. One reason for the proposed change is that the rule is
no longer widely used. Fee shifting is not applicable in cases where the plaintiff is covered by taxsubsidized legal aid, which is available to more than half the population in England. See id. More
compelling is the fact that the rule deters middle-class individuals and small businesses from
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was the Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act of
1995.9 Among other provisions, the bill required "clear and convincing
evidence" that the harm suffered by a plaintiff was caused by the
defendant's malicious conduct before punitive damage assessments could
be imposed.90 It also limited punitive awards in all civil actions to three
times the economic damages or $250,000, whichever was greater.9 1
Unlike the House bill, the Senate's version was limited to the products
liability area.92 Along with other aspects of the amendment that needed
to be reconciled with the House measure, the Senate version limited
punitive damages to two times the compensatory award (economic and

pursuing relatively good cases against large corporate defendants. Even a small risk of incurring a
large attorney's fee award and its financial consequences will lead to one-sided settlements that favor
wealthy defendants. See Philip H. Corboy, Newt Is Cooking the Numbers, TEX. LAX'., Apr. 17, 1995,
at 28.
There are states that presently practice a modified English Rule, with the vast majority
providing only one-way fee shifting to a winning plaintiff rather than allowing for fee shifting to a
winning defendant as well. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
InjuredPerson'sAccess to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1629 (1993). In 1980, however, Florida
adopted a two-way fee shifting English Rule, primarily because of lobbying efforts of the Florida
Medical Association ("FMA"). See id. at 1620. Because it exempted insolvent plaintiffs, the FMA
quickly realized that the statute resulted in larger awards when plaintiffs won and was of no benefit
when defendants prevailed against insolvent plaintiffs. The FMA reversed its position soon after, and
convinced the legislature to repeal the statute in 1985. See id. at 1620-22.
The second bill, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1058, 104th
Cong. (1995), amended federal securities law, making it much more difficult to initiate securities
fraud claims against publicly traded companies and stockbrokers. It was passed into law over
President Clinton's veto in December of 1995. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78). Plaintiffs must now meet
a much higher level of specificity in alleging fraud. Furthermore, the law mandates: (1) plaintiffs'
certification that they did not purchase the security through their attorney, (2) a showing of
specifically how an award is to be divided, (3) caps for attorney's fees, and (4) required sanctions
for violations of Rule 11, among other provisions that seek to decrease the number of securities
fraud suits that are filed. See id. at 738, 740, 742.
89. H.R. 1075, 104th Cong. (1995).
90. See id. § 201(a). Perhaps recognizing that punitive damages are "quasi-cririnal," see supra
text accompanying notes 14-16, and not purely civil or criminal in nature, a majority of states have
already made the move to this standard. See Andrew Blum, Tort Reform: Camel'sNose into State
Law, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 20, 1995, at Al. The previous standard, a preponderance of the evidence, can
be viewed as too loose, while the beyond a reasonable doubt standard can be understood as imposing
too great a burden upon plaintiffs' opportunities for recovery of what can easily be characterized as
a "quasi-civil" damage.
91. See H.R. 1075 § 201(b). In addition, the bill would have limited pain and suffering awards
in medical malpractice actions to $250,000, prohibited joint liability for noneconomic loss, established time limits and defenses for liability, and prohibited punitive damage awards against
manufacturers of drugs or devices approved by the government. See id. §§ 107, 108, 301.
92. See Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995, S.565, 104th Cong. (1995).
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noneconomic damages) or $250,000, whichever was greater. 9
Many commentators felt that the chances of reaching a compromise
package were slight.94 But Congress, through joint committee, eventual-

ly agreed upon a version that reflected the Senate's proposals,95 only to
have it vetoed by President Clinton on May 2, 1996.96 On the day after

Clinton's inauguration for his second term in 1997, identical legislation
was introduced in the Senate by Majority Leader Trent Lott. 97 He stated
that there were "'some signals from the administration that they're
willing to work on legal reform proposals with us better than they did in
the past."'9 8 Others are not as optimistic in their assessment of the bill's

chances; although President Clinton voiced support for "'real commonsense product liability reform,"' 99 he did so while vetoing Congress's

similar measure in 1996."°
If, however, the bill eventually becomes law with its punitive
damage cap provision in place, it would have a disproportionate and
discriminatory impact upon the nation's lower economic strata.
Congress's planned cap, based on a multiplier of compensatory damages,
allows people with higher incomes to collect higher punitive awards.1"'

93. See id. § 8(b).
94. See, e.g., Greenhouse,supra note 68, at AI8 (characterizing the attempts at compromise
as "stalled").
95. See Product Liability Fairness Aes of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1995). Separate
provisions apply to Title II of the amendment, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act, which is a
narrow products liability law reform; it is limited to protecting suppliers of component parts and raw
materials used in medical devices.
96. See John F. Harris, Clinton Vetoes ProductLiabilityMeasure: Move 7Wggers Barrageof
AccusationsBetween WhiteHouse andHillRepublicans, WASH. POsT, May 3,1996, at A14. Clinton
stated that he did "not believe that we have to have a legal system which shuts the door on the
legitimate problems of ordinary people." Id.
Unlike the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, which became law over Clinton's veto
on December 22, 1995, the House failed to override the veto of the products liability measure, but
only by 23 votes. See For the Record, WASH. POST, May 16, 1996, (Weekly-Maryland), at MS,
97. See Jost, supra note 1, at 18.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also Middleton, supra note 8, at 60.
100. Representative Jim Ramstad (R-Minn.), an ardent supporter of tort reform, described the
veto as "one of the most disappointing decisions from the White House of the past two years."
Ramstad, supra note 88, at A21.
101. Commenting on the negotiations between the House and Senate over provisions in the
1995 bill, Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) recognized this disparity and asked that any
compromise legislation include provisions that would "allow a retiree to recover as much as a
similarly injured CEO, whose income would permit a higher punitive award." Harvey Berkman,
House Names Tort Conference Group, NAT'I L.J., Nov. 27, 1995, at A12. Although Conyers's
statement was limited to retirees, the same situation applies to any individual with lower earnings
capacity. This concern remains as a valid criticism of the 1997 bill.
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The initiation of a suit challenging the constitutionality of this type of
punitive damage cap can be expected. Although the Supreme Court

seems to have stated quite clearly that there is no constitutional right to
punitive damages,1" constitutional challenges to punitive damage
multipliers might arguably succeed." 3 Moreover, when linked directly
to economic or compensatory damages, punitive damages will work to
the advantage of those with greater incomes and disparately impact those
with a limited earning capacity.

C. Current State Tort Reform Legislation
State legislative efforts to control tort law is not entirely a recent
development. 1" However, there has been a recent flurry of tort reform
on the state level since the 1994 elections, which not only gave a
congressional majority to the Republicans, but also resulted in thirty
Republican state governors and full control by Republicans of nineteen
state legislatures. 105 More than seventy new tort law bills were intro-

Others have echoed this shortcoming when commenting on caps that impose limits on
noneconomic damages.
[I]f the person injured already had a good-paying job, that person could receive a great
deal more in compensation than a minimum wage worker, an unemployed person or a
housewife with no salaried position.
An arbitrary cap on damages would have favored the wealthy and would
discriminate against children, seniors on fixed incomes and other low-income people who
are victims of automobile accidents, dangerous products or the negligence of others.
See Mills, supra note 88, at 1C.
102. See Janet V. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus Plaintiffs"Rights: The ConstitutionalBattle
over Statutory Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 405, 435-37 (1995).
103. For example, a Tenth Amendment argument can easily be envisioned if Congress passes
the proposed cap into law. The BMW decision had two dissenting opinions (Justice Scalia, joined
by Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist), both
arguing that review of punitive damages in tort law should be left to the states. See BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1610, 1614 (1996); see also supra note 80 and accompanying
text. Other constitutional challenges may be successful as well. Consider Henderson v. Alabama
Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993), which invalidated a state tort reform statute that limited
punitive damages because it violated the state constitutional right to a jury trial. See also infra text
accompanying notes 124-26.
104. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 60, at 195; Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet
Revolution Revisited: An EmpiricalStudy of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages
in Products Liability, 16 JUsT. Sys. J. 21, 27-33 (1993).
105. See Middleton, supra note 8, at 56-57.
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duced following the 1994 elections' °6 and a few states have enacted
substantive new tort reform laws as a result. 1' 7
For example, new laws in Illinois, the Civil Justice Reform
Amendments of 1995,1°8 are being viewed by tort reform advocates as

the "most comprehensive changes in tort law adopted by a state legislature."'1°" The statute includes provisions for limiting noneconomic
damages in most tort cases to $500,000;" ° abolishing joint and several
liability;' capping punitive damages at three times economic damages
(except in medical malpractice cases, in which punitive damages are
disallowed altogether);"' and requiring plaintiffs to file a "Product
Liability Affidavit of Merit" when a suit is initiated to ensure, through
an expert, that the action is not frivolous." 3
Many other states have imposed some sort of limitations on tort law4
as well; for example, either requiring or permitting bifurcated trials."
Generally, bifurcated trials are designed to protect defendants from
prejudicial determinations of punitive awards by first determining
whether a plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. Then, in a second
proceeding, the jury determines the size of the award, if one was
warranted.11 5
Additionally, many states have enacted laws, when considering
punitive damages, that raise the burden of proof from a preponderance

106. See id.
107. For example, Texas has enacted laws that adopt the English Rule for certain frivolous suits
and defenses, cap punitive damages, and in medical malpractice actions, impose a $5,000 bond or
an expert's report for each health care provider named in a suit. In Wisconsin, laws that cap
noneconomic awards in medical malpractice actions and limit joint and several liability have been
enacted. Indiana has passed tort reform law that introduces comparative fault to products liability
law and adopts an English Rule that imposes a shift of $1,000 in legal fees to a losing party that
rejects a settlement offer. See Eleanor N. Bradley, Civil Liability: State Reform of Tort Laws
ProceedsDuringCallsforFederalPreemption,Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at C-98 (May 22,
1995).
108. Pub. Act No. 89-7, 1995 Ii. Legis. Serv. 224 (Vest) (codified in scattered sections of XL.

CoM. STAT. ANN. (West 1996)).
109. Middleton, supra note 8,at 57.
110. See 735 ILL. COwP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.1(a) (West 1996). In response, three lawyers
filed suit, claiming that the noneconomic damages cap violates a plaintiffs right to a jury trial. See
PendingLegislation, NAT' L.., Mar. 20, 1995, at A22.
111. See 735 ILL. CoM. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117.
112. See id. 5/2-1115, -1115.05(a).
113. See id. 5/2-1115.03.
114. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 60, at 205-12, app. A (listing 13 states that either require
or permit bifurcated trials as of 1994).
115. See id. at 197.
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of the evidence to a clear and convincing standard.11 6 Some states have
passed laws which require plaintiffs to pay a percentage of any punitive
damages received into either the general treasury of the state or into a
specially earmarked fund,"' as well as enacting statutes that cap
noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering."' Although few
states have passed statutes that limit the amount of attorneys' fees, 1 9
or provide for a collateral source rule, whereby damages are reduced by

other forms of compensation (for example, workers compensation), 2 °
these measures do exist and are indicative of how far-reaching tort
reform legislation has become.

In all, twenty-seven states have some type of constraint on punitive
damages;"' twelve have either a flat cap or multiplier; while four
have prohibitions on punitive damages altogether."z Although flat caps
and multipliers have generally withstood constitutional challenge, this
was not the case recently in Alabama. 24 The Alabama Supreme Court,
in Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 2S held that a statute which

imposed a flat cap of $250,000 on punitive damages was unconstitutional
because it violated a plaintiff's right to a trial by jury.126 While consti-

116. See id. at 196-97. This seems appropriate, given the "quasi-criminal" nature of punitive
damages. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. At least 33 states have already moved to a clear
and convincing standard. Sixteen continue to use the lesser, preponderance of the evidence standard,
with Colorado as the lone state that imposes the beyond a reasonable doubt level of proof. See Blum,
supra note 90, at Al.
117. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 60, at 196. Colorado, however, declared such a statute
unconstitutional on grounds of an impermissible taking. See Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d
262, 264 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
118. See Middleton, supra note 8, at 59.
119. See Bradley, supra note 107, at C-98.
120. See id.
121. The twenty-seven states that have some type of constraint on punitive damages are:
Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See
Middleton, supra note 8, at 59; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1618-19 (1996).
Ironically, plaintiffs in states that have already imposed various types of caps on punitive
damages, or prohibited them altogether, may benefit from preemption by any successful
congressional measure. Commentary about the 1995 federal products liability reform bill, recognized
this as well. "Of the ten states that have passed punitive caps, at least six are stricter than the federal
bill's.. . " See Blum, supra note 90, at Al.

122. Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. See Middleton, supra note 8, at 59.
123. Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington. See iad
124. See Hallahan, supra note 102, at 430-34.
125. 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993).
126. See id. at 893-94.
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tutional challenges to tort reform measures rarely favor plaintiffs, it is

unlikely that these actions will diminish as long as tort reform advocates
continue to push through new legislation.'27
IV. IS THERE A TORT LITIGATION CRISIS?

Advocates for tort reform commonly assert that the tort system, and
particularly products liability law, is in need of immediate attention and
reform.'t Claiming massive increases in the number and amount of
punitive damages awarded,'29 and the associated burden that increased
tort actions impose upon our courts,' businesses point to the advent
of the modem multi-million dollar award as a direct threat to their
economic interests.'' These advocates also assert that, with the increased risk of disabling punitive damage awards, businesses are less
likely to introduce innovative products or improve existing ones.' 32
Furthermore, with the increased insurance coverage necessary to
adequately safeguard against possible future losses or even bankruptcy,
American businesses complain of rising costs.' It is argued that these
127. See Hallahan,supra note 102, at 441.
128. During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, Vice President Dan Quayle issued
a report indicating that the tort system cost nearly $300 billion yearly. That assertion was later
proved to be fictitious. See Marc Galanter, Anti-lawyerShibbolethsDon't Stand Up, TEX LAW., Feb.
17, 1992, at 14.
129. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 60,at 197-98.
130. As support for this assertion, tort reform proponents claim that between 1960 and 1990
federal court cases nearly tripled to more than 250,000.each year. This claim is misleading, however,
because of its inclusion of criminal cases, bankruptcy cases, Social Security actions, and suits by the
government which "don't fit the 'litigious society' stereotype. In fact, only 36,978 of those cases
were personal injury suits. Most significantly, the number of civil suits, the number of personal
injury suits and the number of products liability suits in federal courts have all declined since the
mid-1980s." Corboy, supra note 88, at 28.
On the other hand, many defense lawyers contend that punitive damage caps have reduced
the number of settlements so greatly, given the reduced window of liability for punitive awards, that
businesses are increasingly more willing to contest actions in courts. See Barbara Franklin, Learning
Curve: Lawyers Must ConfrontImpact of Changes on Litigation Strategies, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1995,
at 62, 62.
131. See Hurd & Zollers, supra note 60, at 191.
132. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Punitive Damages in Products Liability: A
Research Report, 3 PRODUCT LTAmrrY W. 85, 85 (1992).
133. Figures gathered by the Insurance Information Institute show a jump in general liability
insurance premiums from $6 billion in 1981, to $11.5 billion in 1985. By 1987, premiums nearly
doubled again, reaching $20.9 billion annually. See Casey Bukro, Victims of Liability: Corporate
America Is FightingBack Saying the Legal System Has 'Run Amok 'MakingHuge Punitive Damage
Awards in Often Bizarre Cases, Cl. TRaB., Sept. 11, 1996, at 1.However, that number slid to $18.8
billion by 1994, the latest year for which figures are available. See id.
Many tort revisionists argue that the "insurance crisis" of the 1980s is directly linked to
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increased costs, which must be passed on to consumers, in conjunction
with an aversion to taking the risk of introducing new products, impose
a serious constraint upon national corporate interests and their efforts to

remain competitive with foreign imports.'

4

These constraints create a

situation that hurts consumers' interests by limiting product choices and
lowering spending power.'35
Commentators, however, have noted that the recent "insurance

crisis" of the 1980s was the result of shaky investments by insurance
companies during the period of high interest rates in the late 1970s and

early 1980s, and was not attributable to any claimed increases in
litigation risk.136

[T]he insurers always find it convenient to blame, not their own
previous investments or marketing strategy, but the courts and tort
doctrine, for the need to raise premiums .... [B]laming the tort system
for the increases became a convenient means of putting these rate
increases through and covering for the shortsighted marketing strategies
of the previous decade. 37

Additionally, data shows that in 1993, for every $100 in retail sales,
13
products liability insurance premiums cost businesses only 19.9 cents.

massive increases in tort litigation.
The root of [rapid increases in insurance premiums], in the insurer view, has been the
unbalanced, reflexively pro-plaintiff development of tort law during the relevant period,
driven by the inherently "deep-pocket" orientation of the insurance rationale. Thus the
only way to restore equilibrium is to eliminate the insurance rationale from tort doctrine
and to revise the unwholesome liability rules it has produced.

MARi C. RAHDERT, COVERwG AccIDENT Costs: INsUPIANCE, LiABiLrrY AND TORT REFORM 113
(1995).
134. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 132, at 85; see also George L. Priest, The New Legal
StructureofRisk Control, 119 DAEDALus 207,223 (1990) (reporting that 25% of U.S. manufacturers
have discontinued new product research for liability reasons). However, other commentators attack
the assumption that the legal system is responsible for inhibiting economic growth. See e.g., Frank
B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists: An EmpiricalEvaluation of the
Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and PoliticalSystem, 70 TEX. L. REV. 645, 649
(1992) (arguing that studies claiming to show that lawyers have a negative effect on the economy
are "flawed by unrealistic theoretical assumptions"); Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers ImpairEconomic
Growth?, 17 L. & SOC. INQuIRY 585 (1992).
135. The suggestion is that if a business cannot pass along the increased cost of its liability
insurance to consumers, because of their unwillingness to pay more for products, the practical effect
is removal of products from the market. See George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO
ST. L. 497, 500 (1987).
136. See Mills, supra note 88, at IC.
137. RAHDERT, supra note 133, at 113-14.
138. See NADER& SMrTH, supranote 19, at 279 (discussing studies conducted by the Consumer
Federation of America). Figures for 1994 show that insurance for products liability, employment
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Many economists, politicians, and commentators do not believe or
even mention punitive damage awards as having an adverse affect on
national corporate interests by creating competitive disadvantages for
American compared to foreign businesses.'39 Foreign corporations can
be subjected to the same laws as American corporations when doing
business in the United States."4 This fact alone should raise serious
doubts concerning the reliability of claims that American business
interests are jeopardized because of runaway punitive awards. Furthermore, relying on empirical data rather than rhetoric, a recent federal
study assessed the factors that are truly affecting American business
competitiveness as capital costs, the quality of human resources, and
technology-transfer diffusion, not the tort liability system.' 4 '
Despite these findings, however, the debate over whether consumer
interests are adversely affected by punitive damage awards continues.
Even assuming that assertions by businesses and tort reform proponents
are true, if consumers are unwilling to pay for products that cannot be
made safe without prohibitive price increases to cover growing costs, one
can easily characterize this situation as furthering social utility rather than
producing an unacceptable economic constraint. "In other words,
products liability benefits not only the injured worker or consumer. It

discrimination, shareholder suits, and other claims amounted to only 25.5 cents for every $100 in
revenue. See id. Insurance companies seem to admit that these figures are indeed correct, with the
industry reporting that "products liability adds less than 1 percent to the price of most products--often far less." Corboy, supra note 88, at 28.
139. Inan era of record-breaking stock market levels, and large increases in corporate
executives' salaries and benefits, it is indeed ironic that businesses are complaining of competitive
disadvantage. See Clay Chandler, Whodunit?, VASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1996, at H-1; John J. Curtin,
Jr., Lawyers, Competitivenessand Legal Reform, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1991, at A22.
140. In fact, some commentators recognize that Congress's proposed products liability
legislation would have the reverse effect of favoring foreign manufacturers over their American
counterparts.
Although the German or Japanese manufacturer is likely to have an agent in the United
States for service of process, suing a foreign manufacturer is a difficult and expensive
proposition. Ironically, one unintended consequence of this provision would be to give
foreign manufacturers an advantage over U.S. companies in avoiding liability.
Corboy, supra note 88, at 28. Compare Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987), in which the Court held that the federal government's interest in foreign relations may be
best served by inquiring into the reasonableness of an assertion of jurisdiction when bringing a
foreigner into court, leading to the Court's unwillingness to find an alien's substantial burden
outweighed when the interests at stake are minimal.
141. See Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Congress, Making Things Better: Competing in
Manufacturing,OTA-ITE-443 (Feb. 1990).
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makes society safer for all Americans.'"
This characterization is reinforced by one of the most inclusive
empirical studies to date, in which Professor Michael Rustad found that
continuing complaints about dangerous products went largely unheeded
by businesses until they were hit with large punitive damage penalties. 43 In approximately 80% of products liability cases that resulted
in punitive damage awards, however, manufacturers took remedial steps
to improve product safety measures in order to avoid future lawsuits. 1"
This should come as no surprise, given the deterrence goal of tort law in
general and punitive damages in particular.
Much of the empirical data available further suggests that the
characterization of a tort system out of control is largely inaccurate. Most
systematic empirical studies, including one conducted by the General
Accounting Office, 45 have found that there is every indication that
punitive damage awards are very rare and are not typically excessive."
This evidence runs counter to tort reformers' claims that juries are biased
in favor of plaintiffs and against large corporate defendants. 47

142. Corboy, supra note 88, at 28; see also Mills, supra note 88, at 1C.One commentator
appropriately noted the following:
Without the civil justice system ....punch presses would still lack guards and
two-handed controls, fork-lift trucks would still lack seatbelts and wrap-around seats,
Pinto gasoline tanks would still explode, Dalkon Shield IUDs would still render women
sterile, silicone breast implants would still cause crippling disease, children's pajamas
would still be made of flammable fabrics, and unsafe consumer and industrial goods of
every description would still be manufactured and sold in America.
Steven H. Schafer, Federal-Style Tort Reform Does Matter to You, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 17,
1995, at 35.
143. See Michael Rusted, In Defense of Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with EmpiricalData, 78 IOWA L. REV.1, 79 (1992).

144. See id.
145. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILrTY: VERDICTS AND CASE

RESOLUTION IN FivE STATES (1989).
146. See id. at 31; see also Andrew Blum, Study FindsPunitives Are Small, Rare, NAT'L L.J.,
July 1, 1996, at A6 (reporting on a recent study by Cornell Law School Professor Theodore
Eisenberg which "confirmed previous findings that [punitive damage] awards are not as frequent or
as big as tort reformers claim"); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive
Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 43 (1990) (finding that "fjfuries awarded punitive damages
infrequently, and when they were awarded, the amount was generally modest'); Saks, supra note
33, at 1254 (noting that empirical studies "fail to support' the claim that "punitive damages [have
increased] both in frequency and size").
147. See generally STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIEs AND THE POLrTICS OF
REFORa (1995) (finding no basis to conclude that there is any recent national pattern that exhibits
more frequent or larger jury awards); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Juror'sJudgements
ofBusinessLiability in Tort Cases:Implicationsfor the LitigationExplosion Debate, 26 L. & SOC'Y
REv. 85 (1992) (revealing that jurors are skeptical of plaintiffs' tort claims against businesses and
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Rustad's study found that there have only been 355 punitive damage
awards in products liability actions over the twenty-five year period from
1965 to 1990,148 even though consumer products account for "the
deaths of an estimated 29,000 and injuries to an estimated 30 million
others" yearly.1 49 This translates to less than fifteen cases per year
nationwide. The median punitive award was $565,000, with only about
13% of the cases resulting in amounts that either equalled or exceeded
four times the compensatory award. 5
Department of Justice figures released in 1995 also indicate that
products liability cases amounted to less than 2% of overall civil cases
filed in the busiest state courts, and only .004% of the cases which
eventually came to trial."' Moreover, "[e]ven smaller were the very
minuscule number of cases in which juries awarded punitive damages."'5 It is, therefore, difficult to find any rationale for the assertion
that courts are clogged with products liability actions or that punitive
damages are compromising American business interests as proponents for
53
tort reform claim.
Unlike these empirical studies of our tort system, much of the
clamor for tort reform relies on mere anecdotal evidence to support its
advocates' claims of a system out of control. Even more disturbing is
their apparent lack of concern for the facts underlying the "evidence." A
glaring example is the well-known, but misunderstood, McDonald's
coffee case which was endlessly repeated by tort reform supporters.
Stella Liebeck, an eighty-one year old resident of Albuquerque, New
Mexico, spilled scalding coffee on her lap after leaving a McDonald's
take-out window."M She later sued McDonald's and was awarded $2.7
million in punitive damages.' 5 Looked at by many as a get-rich-quick

concerned over the litigation crisis and the need for limiting the size of awards).

148.
149.
150.
151.

See Rustad, supra note 143, at 37, 38 tbl.3.
Id. at 43.
See id. at 50.
See Mills, supra note 88, at IC (commenting on the Department of Justice figures).

152. Id.

153. See generally Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, EmpiricalPatternsin Punitive Damage
Cases:A Description ofIncidenceRates andAwards 1, 8 (American Bar Found. Working Paper No.

8705, 1988) (finding that the typical punitive damages assessment was awarded less frequently and
was usually smaller than reformers claim after studying 42 counties in 10 states).
154. See Mary Voboril, Out of Control?: Gop Wants to Limit Liability Suits, but Others See
Erosion ofRights, NEWSDAY (New York City), Feb. 26, 1995, (Money and Careers Section), at 1.

155. See Liebeckv. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV 93-02419, 1995 WL 360309,
at *I(N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994).
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scheme, created by a cagey lawyer and a clumsy plaintiff who suffered
little substantial injury, the facts reveal a different situation.
Liebeck's injury was far from insubstantial;1 6 she spent eight days
in a hospital with third-degree bums over 6% of her body. McDonald's
was serving its coffee at 1802 to 190 2F, which was considerably hotter
than other fast-food establishments. In addition, and of particular interest,
McDonald's had faced over 700 claims from individuals who had been
scalded by coffee by the time Liebeck was injured. Far from forwarding
a get-rich-quick scheme, Liebeck had initially tried to settle her claim
with McDonald's for $20,000, but her offer was rejected. Finally, the
trial court, upon reviewing the award, reduced the amount of punitive
damages to $480,000; Liebeck eventually settled the case for an
undisclosed amount. It is readily apparent that such anecdotal accounts
and misinformation, cited by tort reform proponents as evidence of a tort
system run amok, should be viewed not only with healthy skepticism, but
also with justifiable disdain.
V. PROPOSALS THAT ARE NONDISCRIMINATORY
The only reliable information concerning the effects of punitive
damages is contained in empirical studies, rather than in "horror stories"
about the tort law system. Enacting reform measures based upon
speculative advances of social utility should not be considered when they
exact a heavy toll on society's economically disadvantaged. If punitive
damage caps in products liability actions are imposed, the poor will
undoubtedly experience restricted court access. Lawyers will become
increasingly unwilling to represent plaintiffs in lawsuits that have little
or no prospect of yielding adequate compensation for the large amount
of time and money invested-a necessary component of any successful
litigation waged against large business interests.
Additionally, even if lawyers choose to file products liability actions
on behalf of poor claimants, the quality level of the representation will
assuredly fall. First, as prospective awards shrink, more qualified
attorneys may decide to become more discriminating in the types of
cases they choose to bring. Second, lesser financial returns for lawyers,
because of smaller contingency fees, translates into greater workloads and
the increasing inability of attorneys to devote the same attention to cases
that they once could. Thus, poor plaintiffs will ultimately encounter a

156. The following account can be found in Is Lawsuit Reform Good for Consumers?, 60
CONSt1ER REP. 305, 312 (May 1995).
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civil litigation system that either belittles their claims, or worse, ignores
their claims altogether.
Moreover, the twin goals of punitive damages, retribution and
deterrence, will be frustrated by such caps. Flat caps on punitive damages
will result in businesses merely computing the cost effectiveness of
ignoring consumer safety once they discover product defects. And given
the relatively low monetary amount caps impose on punitive awards, the
obvious result is a gross inability for the economically disadvantaged to
punish or deter egregious conduct by multi-billion dollar businesses.
Caps that are based on some multiple of compensatory damages fare
no better. In instances where the plaintiff is on the lower end of the
economic scale, how can a low punitive award be justified when the
same misconduct on the part of a defendant leads to a greater award for
a more financially successful plaintiff? Multiplier caps lead to this odd
result: rich plaintiffs are somehow more deserving of retribution for
egregious conduct and are somehow in a better position to deter.
Products liability litigation with punitive damage caps in place will
eventually lead to the imposition of punitive awards which help to ensure
that the rich get richer and the poor are left out of the courtroom.
Even if one believes that the scenario of runaway juries truly exists,
thereby indicating a need for some sort of tort reform, viable alternatives
to punitive damage caps are available. Although it is nearly impossible
to gather empirical data that would be broad enough to study the likely
effects of punitive damage caps on individuals with lower earning
capacity, the alternative-simply ignoring the problem and imposing
punitive caps-is unacceptable and unwise. Legislatures should attempt
to protect individuals who cannot protect themselves, rather than rushing
into reforms which raise serious questions regarding their necessity or
effectiveness. For legislatures concerned with jury indiscretion, many
reform measures are available which do not have a discriminatory impact
on the poor. Instead of limiting the poor's access to our courts, and
therefore limiting the availablity of compensation for injuries received by
deserving plaintiffs, statutes targeting the perceived tort litigation crisis
should be designed to avoid unjust results.
One alternative to punitive caps is the adoption of a clear and
convincing standard of proof, which has already been enacted by many
states, either by common law or statute.'57 Reflecting the "quasi-

157. See Blum, supra note 90, at Al.
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criminal" nature of punitive damages,15 this standard will not severely
affect representation of poor plaintiffs, because these damages are
normally only available in cases where the defendants have acted
egregiously. Furthermore, a clear and convincing standard, although
possibly affecting the availability of punitive damages in any given case,
does not alter the size of any potential punitive award. It is this latter
concern, which presents itself when statutory caps are imposed, that
proves problematic when claims by poor plaintiffs are initially brought
to lawyers: Are the costs of a complicated and lengthy litigation
outweighed by the available potential returns?
A second recommendation is that punitive damages should be
limited to a one-time assessment for a particular instance of misconduct.
The initial plaintiff may recover a reasonable percentage after expenses
(perhaps 25%), with the remainder being set aside in a fund from which
future plaintiffs who have been awarded punitive damages, because of
injuries received from the same product, may also recover a set percentage. This may effectively quiet the tort reformers' criticism of punitive
damages as a windfall for plaintiffs."i 9 Of course, in situations where
the prospect of future injury to other persons is remote, the state's
percentage can be allocated to a fund that is reasonably related to
products liability law. Possible examples include: safety programs, which
can be created to inform the public about other products that are under
recall because they are already acknowledged as unsafe; and increased
governmental inspection procedures, which can help to ensure compliance with existing or future regulations that target manufacturing
procedures, with a primary focus on resolving problems that result in
manufacturing defects."co
On the other hand, when numerous injuries occur on a nationwide
scale, any effort by a particular state to limit recovery of punitive
damages to a one-time assessment cannot serve to restrict another state's
right to impose a punitive damage award to a plaintiff in an action
brought within its jurisdiction. Current legislation in Congress, the
Multiple Punitive Damages Fairness Act of 1997,161 introduced by

158. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.

160. Legislatures must be careful when drafting such provisions. The Colorado Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional a statute that reserved a percentage of punitive damage awards to
the state, holding that it was violative of the Takings Clause. See Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818
P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (en bane).

161. S.78, 105th Cong. (1997).
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Senator Oren Hatch (R-Utah), attempts to solve this problem. It seeks
to prohibit the imposition of punitive damages "against a defendant based
on the same act or course of conduct for which punitive damages have
already been sought or awarded,"162 unless "the claimant will offer
new and substantial evidence of previously undiscovered,
additional
63
defendant."'
the
of
part
the
on
behavior
wrongful
The Act, however, contains two major weaknesses that merit serious
consideration by Congress. First, it is constitutionally questionable. Any
attempt to prohibit a state from protecting its own citizens from unsafe
products, by deterring and punishing the egregious conduct of a
defendant through punitive damages, is susceptible to constitutional
attack via commonly established principles of federalism and on the
ground that it denies individuals the right to a jury trial. Second,
prohibiting punitive damages merely because they "have already been
sought" by previous unsuccessful plaintiffs is simply too great of a
restraint upon deserving future claimants. Not only does this provision
ignore the vagaries that naturally occur in any jury verdict, it also bars
a claimant from seeking punitive damages in situations where a previous
plaintiff has produced evidence of the defendant's misconduct, but has
settled the case prior to reaching a verdict.
Furthermore, when considered with the opinion in the BMWf case,
which implies that punitive damages could be limited by misconduct that
occurs only within the state,164 the Act would effectively create an
atmosphere where businesses would be immune from the sting levied by
punitive damage awards. 65 If businesses do not recognize a loss of
profits after engaging in fraudulent behavior or after knowingly
marketing dangerous products, the deterrent factor of punitive damages
will become an empty promise.
Instead, class actions should be encouraged as a viable alternative."e Although operating imperfectly in situations where a company
162. Id. § 3(b) (emphasis added).
163. Id. § 3(c).
164. "Given that the verdict was based on out-of-state conduct that was lavful where it occured,
we need not consider whether one State may properly attempt to change a tortfeasor's unlawful
conduct in another State." BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 n.20 (1996).
165. Following this same reasoning, legislatures should be encouraged to pass statutes
prohibiting businesses from satisfying punitive damage awards through insurance.
166. Cf.David Rosenberg, Class Actionsfor Mass Torts: DoingIndividualJustice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. LJ. 561, 569-74 (1987) (arguing for mandatory class action suits for mass torts).
Providing class actions in mass torts will also help ensure that small claimants have access to
compensation. See id. at 594.
Courts must be careful in how they approach this issue, however. Otherwise, disadvantaged
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has nationwide sales of a defective product, this alternative to punitive
caps (and the strict guidelines imposed by the Multiple Punitive Damages
Fairness Act) offers greater protection from multiple assessments of
punitive damages against defendants. It also allows poor plaintiffs access
to punitive damage awards, either in the form of participation in a class
action or by disbursement from a punitive damages "fund." The fund can
reasonably ensure that poor plaintiffs will be able to acquire legal
representation from risk-averse plaintiffs' attorneys, thereby satisfying the
"compensatory" function of not only punitive damges,16 but also the
compensatory goal of tort law as well.
Another possible measure is to require the judiciary to issue a
detailed written opinion outlining the reasons for either upholding or
reducing a punitive damage award. This suggestion is in response to
possible problems arising from the TXO decision. 6 How can plaintiffs,
or defendants for that matter, who wish to contest a trial judge's review
of a punitive damage award, have any meaningful appeals process
without some reasoning from the trial judge appearing in the record?
Presumably, this measure merely ensures a right to which all litigants
should be entitled and will not, therefore, adversely affect poor litigants.
Similarly, trial judges should give more detailed and precise jury
instructions for the initial determination of.any punitive award.169 This
recognizes a situation that juries can often confront: confusion about how
to accurately assess the correct amount of a punitive damage award.17

plaintiffs may find themselves severely undercompensated. For example, in Flanaghanv. Ahearn
(In re Asbestos Litigation), 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), the dissent scathingly criticized the court's
approval of a class action settlement, describing it as "the first no-opt-out, mass tort, settlement-only,

futures-only class action settlement ever attempted or approved." Id. at 993. One commentator
opined that "Ahearn illustrates the ways in which the class action, originally designed to create a
remedy for small, powerless claimants, can instead be used to cram down a defendants' [sic] solution
upon them." John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Actions, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 16, 1996, at B4.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.

It should also be noted that large punitive

awards grab headlines in the news media. This helps forward the "education" function of punitive
damages. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23. Arguably, the large punitive damages levied

against the Ford Motor Company, resulting from its faulty design of the Pinto, had little affect on
tdie multi-billion dollar company's decision to cancel production. More compelling is the mere fact
that people, once aware of the defect, stopped purchasing the automobile.

168. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); see also supra
text accompanying notes 53-59.
169. For an in-depth analysis and other possible suggestions for an appropriate jury instruction,
see Jacqueline Perezek, Note, On Efficiency, Punishment,Deterrence, and Fairness:A Survey of
Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed JuryInstruction, 27 SUFFoLK U. L. REV. 825 (1993).

170. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (1994) (acknowledging the
inappropriateness of a jury award which mechanically computed punitive damages).
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One possible avenue is to adopt and amend the Haslip factors,17' using
them as a template to create detailed jury instructions which can help
guide the factfinder in determining a punitive award that is "reasonably
related to the goals of deterrence and retribution."' I2 Unlike the Court's
recent BMW decision, which set forth a "guidepost" that considers the
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages,' Haslip recognized that it is proper for juries to consider "the 'financial position' of
the defendant," as well as "the profitability to the defendant of the
wrongful conduct and the desirability of 74removing that profit and of
having the defendant also sustain a loss."'
If BMWs ratio "guidepost" is followed, the result may be courtimposed punitive damage caps in the form of a multiplier. This is not
such an improbable outcome. In the BMW case, on remand from the
Supreme Court to determine the proper amount of the punitive award,
three concurring justices on the Alabama Supreme Court indicated that
in the future a three to one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages should be the limit in all but the most egregious cases. 7
Thus, courts that rely on BMW rather than Haslip in formulating
potential jury instructions risk shutting poor litigants out of the courtroom. Moreover, plaintiffs that have low compensatory damages,
frequently those individuals with a lower earning capacity, will be
adversely affected by any large punitive award assessed against a
deserving corporate tortfeasor that is later reduced in this manner.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Current punitive damage cap legislation in products liability actions,
whether in the form of a multiplier, flat rate, or absolute prohibition,
should be repealed. The possibility that they disparately impact
economically disadvantaged plaintiffs far outweighs any perceived
benefits. Moreover, in some respects their constitutionality is question-

171. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991); see also supra text
accompanying note 43.
172. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21.
173. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-99 (1996); see also supra text
accompanying note 75.
174. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17; see also supra text accompanying note 43.
175. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, No. 1920324, 1997 WL 233910, at *15 (Ala. May 9,
1997). The Alabama court, following the new Supreme Court "guideposts," decided that $50,000
was the appropriate amount for the punitive award in the BMW case. However, "'ft]hat amount is
probably a fourth of actual out-of-pocket expenses' to bring the case." Terry Carter, State Court
Slashes BMW PaintAward, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1997, at 34, 35.
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able, particularly in the case of caps that are in the form of multipliers.
Because there are numerous alternatives for proponents of tort reform,
any future efforts to place limits on punitive damages should also be
reconsidered. Until there is an equitable and fair method for limiting
punitive damages-one that neither inhibits access to the courts, and thus
recovery for injuries innocently received, nor subjects poor plaintiffs to
grossly inferior awards-any restrictions on punitive awards should be
abandoned.
Troy L. Cad"
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